Download How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle AudioBook Free
In 1991, america Military trounced the Iraqi army in battle, only to stumble blindly into postwar turmoil. Then, in 2003, america did it again. How could this happen? How could the strongest ability in modern record attack two wars contrary to the same opponent in only over ten years, win lightning victories both times, yet be woefully unprepared for the aftermath? Because Americans always your investment political areas of war. Time and again, argues Gideon Rose in this penetrating take a look at American wars over the last century, our market leaders have centered more on defeating up the opponent than on creating a well balanced postwar environment. What took place in Iraq was only the most dominant exemplory case of this phenomenon, no exemption to the rule. Woodrow Wilson fought a conflict to make the world safe for democracy but never asked himself what democracy actually meant and then dithered as Germany slipped into chaos. Franklin Roosevelt fixed not to replicate Wilson's flaws but never considered what would eventually his own elaborate postwar arrangements should America's wartime relationship of convenience with Stalin split up after the filming stopped. The Truman administration casually set up voluntary prisoner repatriation as a key American war target in Korea without exploring whether it would obstruct an armistice - which it have for almost per year . 5. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations dug themselves deeper and deeper into Vietnam without the plans for the way to get out. Sketching on huge research, including intensive interviews with individuals in recent wars, Rose re-creates the options that presidents and their advisers have confronted during the final stages of every major conflict from World Conflict I through Iraq. He sets listeners in the room with U.S. officers as they make decisions that impact an incredible number of lives and form today's world - viewing what they noticed, hearing what they read, feeling what they noticed.
